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Abstract
Indirect taxes contribute to a sizeable part of government revenues around the
world. Typically there are few different tax rates, and the goods are partitioned
into classes associated with each rate. The present paper studies how to group the
goods in these few classes. We take as given the number of tax rates and study the
optimal aggregation (or classification) of commodities of the fiscal authority in a
second best setup. The results are illustrated on data from the United Kingdom.
Les impoˆts indirects forment une part notable des recettes fiscales. D’ordinaire,
on observe un petit nombre de taux diffe´rents, et les biens sont re´partis en classes
associe´es a` chacun de ces taux. On e´tudie ici comment grouper les biens au mieux.
Le nombre de taux est suppose´ fixe´ de manie`re exoge`ne, et on re´sout le proble`me
d’agre´gation (ou de classement) optimal des biens dans un cadre de second rang.
Les re´sultats sont illustre´s sur des donne´es britanniques.
Keywords: indirect tax, Ramsey, aggregation.
JEL classification numbers: H21, H23
1 Introduction
The French government recently wanted to change the rate of the value added
tax bearing on meals taken in restaurants, but the European Union did not
accept France’s demand. The standard theory of indirect taxation would possibly
recommend to tax restaurants at a higher rate than fast food places, e.g. because
rich households spend a larger fraction of their income in restaurants than the
less well-off. This theory, however, does not take into account a strong constraint
imposed on EU members. Indeed, according to the 92/77 directive, EU members
are allowed to set only one or two reduced (low) rates in addition to the standard
(high) tax rate, so that they are forced to impose the same rate on many different
commodities. The purpose of this paper is to describe how different commodities
should be grouped when there is a constraint on the number of tax rates.
The Ramsey tax rule usually assumes that different commodities can be taxed
at different rates, and when consumers have heterogeneous tastes and income,
the optimal tax rates typically differ across goods.1 In a partial equilibrium
framework, assuming no substitution between goods, each commodity is assigned
two numbers: its demand elasticity with respect to own price and its social weight,
which reflects its relative usage among the poor and wealthy in the population.
For a given social weight, the optimal tax rate is inversely proportional to the
price elasticity; and, given the elasticity, the tax rate decreases with the social
weight.
The situation where the number of available tax rates is smaller than the
number of taxable goods has received little attention in the literature. Two
previous theoretical papers are relevant. Gordon (1989) studies an economy where
all goods are initially taxed at the same rate, and considers small changes in a tax
reform perspective. Belan and Gauthier (2004) and Belan and Gauthier (2006)
study the case of low (close to zero) levels of collected tax in a single agent
framework with a finite number of goods. They find that the optimal tax rate
bearing on a good is weakly decreasing in the price elasticity. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no applied analysis of this issue.
In this paper, we depart from Belan and Gauthier (2006) by considering a
continuum (instead of a finite number) of taxable commodities. Each good is
1See Saez (2002). When the consumers have the same tastes and when their labor sup-
plies are separable from their demands for commodities, nonlinear income taxation yields a
uniform taxation of all the goods (Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) and Mirrlees (1976)). Apart
from non separability and/or heterogeneous tastes, optimal indirect tax rates may differ across
commodities for certain types of production functions (Stiglitz (1982), Naito (1999) or Saez
(2004)), if it is possible to evade tax (Boadway, Marchand, and Pestieau (1994)), in order to
correct externalities (Green and Sheshinski (1976)), in presence of uncertainties (Cremer and
Gahvari (1995)), or when the authority implementing direct taxes is not perfectly coordinated
with the one that designs indirect taxes, possibly because the decisions are taken at different
points in time or in space (federal, state or city levels).
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assumed to be negligible with respect to the total, so that it is possible to change
the tax rate bearing on an elementary commodity while leaving unchanged the
whole tax structure and the marginal cost of public funds. This allows us to
consider arbitrary (far from zero) levels of taxes and to derive simple properties
of the optimum. We also take into account heterogeneity and equity concerns.
The theoretical predictions are used to study whether actual tax systems depart
from optimality. We give a first look at this topic on data from the UK. The
assumption that the observed tax rates are optimal provides information on the
underlying social welfare function, which in turn puts restrictions on how to tax
the goods.
The continuum assumption allows us to partially characterize the optimal
grouping structure with the help of a purported tax rate. Such a rate is defined
as the one that the social planner would apply to a good if this good could
be taxed freely, while keeping unchanged the tax rates supported by the other
commodities, fixed at their constrained optimum values. If social welfare satisfies
a single-peakedness property with respect to tax rates, the highest attainable
welfare must be at one of the typically two rates which are the closest to the
ideal rate, on either side of this rate. It remains some uncertainty, at this stage,
concerning the exact conditions under which a given good should be taxed at one
particular rate, among the two relevant candidates.
In practice, it is unlikely that reliable information be available on how price
elasticities change with prices. If one focuses attention on the particular case
where the price elasticities and social weights do not vary with the tax rates,
then one can fully characterize the tax structure, and answer the question about
the exact conditions under which any individual good should be taxed at a given
rate. The result is clear-cut: the Ramsey monotonicity properties are shown
to be weakly satisfied. That is, given the price elasticity, the tax rate is non
increasing with the social weight, and similarly, given the social weight, the tax
rate is typically non increasing with the price elasticity.
The previous argument provides insights on whether a given actual fiscal
scheme is optimal and why it may not be. In order to apply these results to
data from the United Kingdom, we extend the analysis to the case in which cross
price effects are not zero. We assume that the observed rates on the existing
groups are optimally chosen. This yields constraints on the implicit redistributive
aims of the government. It appears that the social weights that best fit the
current tax scheme put most of the weight on the population segment associated
with the middle of the consumption distribution, the fourth and fifth deciles.
For these social weights, the actual commodity groupings do not look far from
optimality. The main departures concern goods whose taxation is likely to rely
on other considerations, environment or public health considerations, than mere
redistribution. Thinking of the French demand to the European Union, in the
U.K., ‘Food out’, which comprises restaurants and fast food places, is currently
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taxed at the standard rate, but appears to be too heavily taxed. Our analysis
actually suggests that some items in this group should be exempted from any
tax.
The paper is organized as follows. A simple framework which assumes sepa-
rability between goods is first analyzed. It is described in Sections 2 and 3, and
the optimal indirect tax schedule when the number of tax rates is restricted is
characterized in Section 4. Section 5 extends the results to the case in which
cross price effects matter. An application to data from the United Kingdom is
presented in the final section. The proof of the main result is at the end of the
paper. An Appendix with supplementary material appears on the web site of the
journal.
2 Consumers
There is a continuum of goods g, g in G, and a numeraire. The typical consumer,
designated with an index c, c in C, maximizes∫
G
u(xg, g, c)µ(g)dg +m
under her budget constraint∫
G
(1 + tg)xgµ(g)dg +m = wc.
Both sets C and G are equal to the [0, 1] interval of the real line. The function
u, defined over IR+ × G × C, is assumed to be increasing, concave and twice
continuously differentiable with respect to consumption xg, xg in IR+, and con-
tinuous with respect to g and c. The consumption of numeraire is denoted by
m. The relative importance of the various commodities is partially captured by
their density µ with respect to the Lebesgue measure. The units of commodities
are chosen so that all producer prices equal 1. Thus, when commodity g is taxed
linearly at rate tg, tg ≥ −1, the consumer price is 1 + tg. Finally, wc is the
exogenous income of consumer c.
Under the usual Inada conditions, the separability assumptions embodied in
(2) imply that the demand ξg(tg, c) of commodity g by consumer c is the unique
solution of the first-order condition u′x(x, g, c) = 1 + tg. It is decreasing and
continuously differentiable with respect to the tax rate.
The indirect utility from consuming a good g taxed at rate tg, writes
vg(tg, c) = u(ξg(tg, c), g, c)− (1 + tg)ξg(tg, c),
and therefore the overall indirect utility of consumer c is∫
G
vg(tg, c)µ(g)dg + wc.
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3 Optimal unconstrained tax schedules
When choosing indirect taxes, the government takes as given market behavior.
It seeks to maximize the sum of the utilities of the consumers, weighted by some
a priori weights αc, αc ≥ 0 for all c, normalized so that∫
C
αcdν(c) = 1,
where ν is the (probability) measure describing the distribution of consumer
characteristics on the set C.
The objective of the government can be written as the sum∫
G
Vg(tg)µ(g)dg, (1)
where
Vg(tg) =
∫
C
αcvg(tg, c)dν(c).
By Roy’s identity,
dVg
dtg
(t) = −ag(t)Xg(t),
where
Xg(tg) =
∫
C
ξg(tg, c)dν(c)
represents the aggregate demand for good g, and
ag(t) =
∫
C
αcξg(t, c)/Xg(t)dν(c)
is a positive number which measures the social weight of good g. Namely, it is
large when the agents c with the largest weights αc consume relatively more of
the good.
Assume first that there is no constraint on rates setting. When fiscal income
to be collected is R, the government has to choose tax rates tg, g ∈ G, which
maximize (1) under the budget constraint∫
G
tgXg(tg) µ(g)dg = R.
Let λ denote the multiplier associated with the budget constraint. At the
optimum, it corresponds to the marginal cost of public funds. The government
problem is equivalent to maximizing∫
G
Lg(tg)µ(g)dg,
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where the Lagrangian Lg(tg) = Vg(tg) + λtgXg(tg) represents the contribution of
good g to the welfare objective. If the authority can freely choose the tax rate
bearing on good g, the necessary first-order condition for an interior optimum is,
appealing to Roy’s identity, −ag(t)Xg(t) + λ
(
Xg(t) + tX
′
g(t)
)
= 0 or, dropping
the index g to simplify notations,
t
1 + t
=
λ− a
λ
X
−(1 + t)X ′
. (2)
This corresponds to the Ramsey rule, in which the tax rate applying to a con-
sumption good is inversely related to the price elasticity −(1 + t)X ′/X of the
(aggregate) demand for this good2.
One should be careful when using the first order condition since the program
of the government is not well behaved, the Lagrangian Lg(tg) being often not
concave in tg.
For instance, in the case where all the agents have demands for good g with
the same constant price elasticity εg, a necessary and sufficient condition for
global concavity of the Lagrangian is λ(1 − εg) ≥ ag (see Appendix A on the
journal web site). If λ(1 − εg) < ag, then the Lagrangian is first concave and
then convex. With constant price elasticity nevertheless, whatever the direction
of the inequality, the Lagrangian is single peaked, so that the first order condition
characterizes a global maximum.
In order to encompass such situations, we use the following assumption:
Assumption 1 Given the marginal cost of public funds λ, a good g satisfies the
single peaked assumption when the function Lg, defined on (−1,+∞), satisfies
one of the following three properties:
1. It is increasing;
2. It is increasing from −1 to some τg(λ) and decreasing from then on;
3. It is decreasing.
There is another large class of situations, on top of the constant elasticity case,
where the single peaked assumption is easy to check. This is when the elasticity of
aggregate demand with respect to the tax rate, tX ′/X, is non increasing in t, and
the social weight of the good is non decreasing3. Contrary to concavity, however,
2Indirect taxation is useless when λ = ag for all consumption goods g, a condition unlikely to
be satisfied when the agents do not have the same tastes, as emphasized in the recent literature,
e.g. in Saez (2002).
3The social weight of a good is non decreasing in the tax rate when the demand of the socially
unfavored (rich) agents decreases relatively to that of the socially favored (poor) agents when
the tax increases. To show the property, observe that the derivative L′ = −aX + λ(X + tX ′)
has the same sign as (λ − a)/λ + tX ′/X. Thus, if a is non decreasing in t and tX ′/X is non
increasing, L′ at most has one change of sign, so that L is single peaked.
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the single peakedness property is not preserved under aggregation: the sum of
single peaked functions is not always single peaked (see Figure 3 of Appendix A).
The normal situation is that of Assumption 1.2. The analysis is easily ex-
tended when the solution goes to the boundaries of the tax domain: under As-
sumption 1.1 (resp., Assumption 1.3), the optimal tax rate is equal to +∞: the
good is made infinitely expensive (resp., to -1: the good is made free).
4 Tax rule with a finite number of rates
Assume now that there is an a priori given finite number K of different tax rates,
tk, k = 1, . . . , K, without loss of generality ranked in increasing order, tk ≤ tk+1
for all k. Let Gk be the subset of goods which are taxed at rate tk and G the
collection of Gk. The government program becomes:

max
(tk,Gk)
K
k=1
K∑
k=1
∫
Gk
Vg(tk)µ(g)dg
K∑
k=1
∫
Gk
tkXg(tk) µ(g)dg = R
K⋃
k=1
Gk = G.
(3)
The government has to choose the K tax rates (or possibly K − 1, if one of them
is constrained to be equal to zero) and the partition of the set of commodities
associated with the various tax rates. Formally, this is a more complicated prob-
lem than the Ramsey problem, since it involves the variables G, to which the
standard Lagrangian methods do not immediately apply.
4.1 Optimal tax rates for a given partition of the goods
Given the partition G, however, the problem is standard. Under usual regularity
conditions, one can write the Lagrangian associated to this problem. When dif-
ferentiating with respect to the tax rates, it is natural to consider the aggregate
commodity Gk,
XGk(t) =
∫
Gk
Xg(t)µ(g)dg.
The necessary first-order condition corresponding to tk, first derived in Diamond
(1973), can then be written as
tk
1 + tk
=
λ− aGk
λ
XGk
−(1 + tk)X ′Gk
=
λ− aGk
λ
1
εGk
. (4)
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In this expression, aGk is the average of the social weights of the individual com-
modities in Gk,
aGk =
∫
Gk
Xg(tk)
XGk(tk)
ag(tk)µ(g)dg,
and εGk is a weighted sum of the elementary price elasticities of the goods g in
Gk,
εGk =
∫
Xg(tk)
XGk(tk)
εg(tk)µ(g)dg.
Hence, given the partition G, optimal tax rates obey the Ramsey rule: The
optimal tax rate tk decreases with both the price elasticity εGk of demand for
goods in Gk and the social weight aGk of this group.
4.2 Optimal partition of the goods
In order to know how to allocate goods across groups, consider an individual com-
modity g, small with respect to the economy. Under the continuum hypothesis, a
change in its tax rate leaves the marginal cost of public funds λ unchanged, since
this parameter depends on the whole tax structure.
In this circumstance, we have:
Theorem 1 A necessary condition for optimality is that, for almost every good,
good g be attached to group Gk such that
Lg(tk) = max
h=1,...,K
Lg(th). (5)
The assumption that there is a continuum of commodities, each negligible
with respect to the whole economy, is crucial here. If a commodity were not
of negligible size, as in Belan and Gauthier (2006), a change in the tax rate it
supports would affect the marginal cost of public funds and the theorem would
not hold. The result of the Theorem is quite intuitive, but its proof (at the end
of the paper) needs some care, involving the Lyapunov theorem.
Let tRg be the tax rate that this good would support in the hypothetical
situation where it would be taxed individually, all remaining goods being taxed
at the (constrained) optimum. For an interior solution, tRg satisfies the Ramsey
rule (2). A direct consequence of the single peakedness of the Lagrangian is
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, at the optimum,
1. If Lg is increasing, good g belongs to the more heavily taxed group K; if it
is decreasing, it belongs to the less taxed group.
2. Otherwise, with tRg the tax rate that maximizes Lg,
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(a) if tRg is larger than tK, commodity g supports the maximal rate;
(b) if there exists k, k < K, such that tk ≤ t
R
g ≤ tk+1, then g is taxed
either at rate tk or at rate tk+1;
(c) if tRg is less than t1, g is taxed at rate t1.
This lemma helps to describe some features of the optimal groups of com-
modities. Indeed, when only efficiency matters (ag is identically equal to one for
all g), Lemma 1 and the monotonicity of the Ramsey formula (2) in elasticities
directly imply:
Theorem 2 At an optimum, in the absence of redistribution motive, if the Ram-
sey price elasticity of good g, εRg = εg(t
R
g ), is smaller than εGK , then good g is
taxed at the maximal rate tK. If ε
R
g is larger than εG1, then good g is untaxed.
Otherwise, g is taxed at one of the k or k + 1 rates such that
εGk ≥ ε
R
g ≥ εGk+1 .
In the absence of a redistribution motive, a weak version of the inverse elas-
ticity rule consequently applies to individual goods, in the sense that the tax rate
which should be supported by each individual good is non increasing with respect
to its price elasticity, when evaluated at the putative free optimum.
In the more general case where the government has a redistributive objective,
the social weights of the commodities typically differ from one. In the plan
(ε, a/λ), when the representative point (εRg , a
R
g /λ) of good g (with a
R
g = ag(t
R
g ))
belongs to the cone delimited by the two half lines
a
λ
= 1−
tk
1 + tk
ε and
a
λ
= 1−
tk+1
1 + tk+1
ε,
Lemma 1 and the first-order condition (2) imply that it should be taxed at one
of the two rates tk or tk+1.
Figure 1 is drawn with three tax rates, t1 = 0.0, t2 = 0.2, t3 = 0.4: the
three dashed lines are the corresponding half-lines which delimitate the cones.
By Theorem 2, all goods g such that ag/λ ≥ 1 should be exempted, while all
those such that ag/λ ≤ 1 − t3εg/(1 + t3) should be taxed at the highest rate
t = 0.4.
Theorem 2 is not sufficient to pin down the exact optimal tax rate that should
be applied to goods whose representative points stand in the intermediate region.
Further insights can be gained from the special case with constant price elasticities
and constant social weights. Then, one can indeed provide a full characterization
of the partition of the plan. In the case of Figure 1 there are actually two curves,
whose exact analytic expression is given in Appendix A on the journal web site,
such that all goods in between these curves should be taxed at rate t2, those
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Figure 1: The efficient tax structure
above this region should be exempted, while those below should be taxed at the
highest rate t3. They are depicted in bold in Figure 1.
When tax rates are non-negative, theses curves are decreasing. In other words,
in any given cone delimited by two half lines corresponding to two rates t and
t′, with 0 ≤ t < t′, there exists a unique threshold social weight above which a
good should be taxed at the lowest rate, t, and below which it should be taxed
at the highest rate, t′. This threshold appears to be decreasing with respect to
price elasticity, which fits the common intuition: The larger the price elasticity
of a good, the smaller the minimum social weight for which it becomes heavily
taxed. Equivalently, for any social weight, there exists a threshold price elasticity
such that a good in this cone will be taxed at the highest possible rate, t′, if and
only if its price elasticity is below this threshold.
Additional properties of these thresholds can be derived. In particular, the
boundary curves are convex, and their slopes tend to that of the upper half line
when the price elasticity goes to infinity. Strict convexity implies that, in any
given cone, two commodities with the same purported ideal rates may be taxed
at different rates in the optimal grouping.
To summarize, with constant price-elasticities and constant social weights,
we have obtained a complete characterization of the tax structure at the level
of individual goods. It turns out that a weak version of the Ramsey rule holds:
The tax rate which should be applied to any individual good is weakly decreasing
with respect to its own individual weight; when tax rates are non negative, it is
also decreasing with respect to its own individual price elasticity.
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5 Non separability of consumers’ preferences
To apply our analysis to the data, we must enlarge the set of individual pref-
erences and introduce, if possible, labor supply together with direct taxes. Let
consequently the tastes of agent c be now represented by the utility function
U(x, Lc, c), where x describes the consumption of goods, a measurable mapping
from the set of commodities G into IR+. The budget constraint of the typical
consumer is: ∫
G
(1 + tg)xgµ(g)dg = Yc,
where Yc is after tax income, i.e. Yc = wcLc−T (wcLc), for an income tax scheme
T .
From now onwards, we shall work conditionally on the labor supply Lc. Let
t be the collection of tax rates (tg), and V (t, Lc, Yc, c), the conditional indirect
utility function of consumer c. The government chooses t which maximizes∫
C
αcV (t, Lc, Yc, c)dν(c)
subject to the budget constraint∫
C
∫
G
tgξg(t, Lc, Yc, c)µ(g)dg dν(c) = R,
where ξg(t, Lc, Yc, c) is the conditional (Marshallian) demand for good g of indi-
vidual c.
Let ρc stand for the marginal utility of income of individual c. Using Roy’s
identity,
∂V
∂tg
= −ρcξg(t, Lc, Yc, c),
and the necessary first-order condition for at maximum of the Lagrangian with
respect to the tax rate tk of group Gk is (see Appendix C on the journal web site)∫
g∈Gk
{
(−ag + λ)Xg + λ
[
tg
∂Xg
∂tg
+
∫
g′ 6=g
tg′
∂Xg′
∂tg
]}
µ(g)dg = 0, (6)
where the social weight of good g now expresses as
ag =
∫
C
ξg
Xg
αcρcdν(c). (7)
If good g could be taxed freely, the individual tax rate tRg would satisfy the
first-order condition associated with an interior maximum,4
(−ag + λ)Xg + λ
[
tRg
∂Xg
∂tg
+
K∑
k=1
tk
∂XGk\{g}
∂tg
]
= 0. (8)
4As indicated in Appendix C, equations (6) and (8) are obtained under the assumption that
substitution between commodities is not too large.
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The analysis of Section 4.2 can then be adapted to this more general setup.
Namely, rewriting the first-order condition (8) as
ag
λ
− bg = 1−
t
1 + t
εg, (9)
where
bg =
1
Xg
K∑
k=1
tk
∂XGk\{g}
∂tg
, (10)
one can draw Figure 1 in the plan (ε, a/λ − b) with a similar interpretation,
provided that the Lagrangian is single peaked with respect to each tax rate tg
separately, with the representative point (εg, ag/λ − bg) of good g evaluated at
the optimal tax rates solution of (8).
6 Illustration with data from the UK
Professor Ian Crawford, from the Institute for Fiscal Studies, has provided us
with uncompensated cross price elasticities for consumption in the UK, grouped
into twenty categories5, homogenous by tax rates, computed along the lines ini-
tiated by Blundell and Robin (1999), and with the budget shares by deciles of
consumption expenditures in the population (the data is reproduced at the end
of the Appendix). A large part of consumption, 49%, is subject to the ‘standard’
(17.5%) tax rate, and a substantial part, 27%, necessities including basic food,
is either exempted or taxed at a zero rate. Our data do not separate exempted
from zero rate items, and we treat the whole category as zero rated.6 Domestic
fuel, 10% of consumption, is taxed at the ‘reduced’ (5%) rate. Tobacco, alcohol,
and petrol and diesel bear large excise tax rates.
In order to see whether the actual grouping of commodities fits the theory
developed above, we assume that the tax authority takes as given after tax in-
comes and chooses optimally both the partition of the commodities and the tax
rates. We want to check whether the data is consistent with this assumption. If
VAT rates are optimally chosen, then they must satisfy the Diamond first order
conditions (6). These restrictions provide some information on the underlying
social weights used by UK government. Given these weights, one can compute
the individual purported rates that would apply to each of the twenty categories
of goods. This allows us to draw the analogous of Figure 1 for the UK, and thus
to assess the optimality of the composition of the commodity groups.
5In the analysis, we shall drop ‘children clothing’, which represents less than 1% of aggregate
consumption expenditure, because the estimated price elasticities are somewhat out of the ball
park.
6The difference between the two categories comes from the fact that a producer of a zero
rated good can reclaim the VAT bearing on his inputs, while the producer of an exempted good
cannot. As a consequence, the exempted goods actually support some tax.
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It is important to emphasize that such an exercise does provide information
on the optimal indirect tax rates given the current income tax schedule. Indeed,
if the government could freely tax income in a non linear way, and if, in addition,
the Atkinson-Stiglitz conditions would prevail (preferences are separable between
commodities and labor, and the preferences for commodities are identical across
individuals at the microeconomic level), then all the goods should be taxed at the
same rate (see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Kaplow (2006), or Laroque (2005)).
Here, however, we work with fixed after tax incomes.7
6.1 The government redistributive objectives
The redistributive stance of the government is represented by a vector of non
negative weights associated with the ten population deciles, whose coordinates
sum up to 1. For consistency, these weights should be such that the Diamond first-
order conditions (6) for the basic three commodity groups, exempted, reduced rate
and standard rate, are satisfied. The tax rates on alcohol, tobacco, and petrol
do not give direct information on the redistributive stance, since they are likely
to depend on other considerations than mere redistribution, e.g. public health or
environmental issues.
As a result, given the observed tax rates, budget shares and price elasticities,8
the ten unknown αcρc and the marginal social cost of public funds λ must sat-
isfy four linear equations, the three first order conditions and the normalization
condition. Therefore, in general, one cannot expect to recover the government ob-
jective from the Diamond first-order conditions: If there is some interior (strictly
positive) solution to the equations, the set of solutions is locally a manifold of
dimension 11− 4 = 7.
In practice, the minimum of the squares of the three left-hand sides of the
Diamond conditions does nevertheless differ from zero. This gives a unique set of
values for the ratios (αcρc/λ). If one normalizes the sum of αcρc over the deciles
7In addition, to the best of our knowledge, there is no general agreement on the empirical
relevance of the Atkinson-Stiglitz conditions. Browning and Meghir (1991) find some evidence
of non separability.
8Since there is a finite number of commodities, we have to rewrite (6) as
∑
g∈Gk

(−ag + λ)Xg + λ ∑
g′∈G
tg′
∂Xg′
∂tg

 = 0. (11)
The consumption, rather than production, price is the numeraire. Using tildas for the variables
measured with the new numeraire, X˜g = (1 + tg)Xg. After some manipulations, (6) becomes
(−aGk + λ)
tk
1 + tk
X˜Gk + λ
∑
k′
1
1 + tk′
X˜G
k′
ε˜G
k′
Gk = 0.
Finally, we work in shares of total consumption, dividing the equalities by total consumption.
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to unity, and compute λ accordingly9, one obtains
λˆ = 1.11,
and most of the weight is on the fourth and fifth deciles
α1ρ1 = 0.03 α4ρ4 = 0.54 α5ρ5 = 0.43.
The left-hand sides of the Diamond conditions (6) are respectively equal to 0.003
for the exempted goods, −0.007 for domestic fuel (the only good taxed at the
reduced rate), and −0.0004 for goods taxed at the standard rate. These numbers
are proportional, up to a positive factor, to the derivatives of the social objective
with respect to the corresponding tax rates, such as given by (6). That is, they are
equal to the social values of marginal changes of the tax rates, measured as tenths
of aggregate consumption. For instance, increasing by 1 point the standard rate,
from 17.5% to 18.5%, would induce a social loss of 0.0004×0.01×10 = 0.004% of
aggregate consumption. The Diamond first-order conditions are therefore close
to be satisfied.
6.2 Is the grouping of commodities optimal?
Figure 2 plots the representative points (εg, ag/λ− bg) of eighteen
10 commodities,
and the half lines
a
λ
− b = 1−
t
1 + t
ε,
corresponding to the current tax rates t. The parameters a, b and ε are set at
their current observed values.11
In fact two points are drawn for each good. The one in large bold type
corresponds to the implicit social weights computed above, while the other one,
in small italic type, represents the good location for a Rawlsian government which
would put all the social weight on the first population decile.
9This means that the social welfare function is normalized so that an increase of aggregate
consumption of dC, uniformly distributed, gives dC/10 to each decile and therefore, for this
choice of normalization, increases social welfare by dC/10. Thus, social welfare is implicitly
measured in tenths of aggregate consumption.
10In the interest of readability, ‘Wine and spirits’ do not appear on the graph: its own price
elasticity is (-)3, much larger than that of the other goods.
11Theory would require to compute the optimal putative tax rate for each considered com-
modity. For lack of better information, we assume that the observed elasticities are good enough
approximations to be used to compute the graph coordinates. We have done some experimen-
tation with more sophisticated computations for b and ε. In particular we have looked at cases
where all the elasticities are constant, equal to their observed values, where demand functions
are linear, and at a couple of other variants, including QAIDS which underlies the empirical
estimation. The results are quite sensitive to the specification of the shape of the demand func-
tions: in particular single peakedness is easily lost, and the Lagrangian may be locally convex
at the observed point. More work is needed in this area.
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b: Petrol and diesel (73.25%)
5: Fruits and Vegetables
1: Bread & cereals
2: Meat and Fish
3: Dairy
4: Tea and Coffee
6: Other Non VAT Foods
7: Books and Newspapers
A: Standard VAT Food
B: Food out 
C: Household Goods and Services
D: Adult Clothing
E: Public Transport
F: Leisure Goods
G: Leisure Services
α : Domestic Fuels (5%)
a: Beer (28%)
c: Tobacco (79.1%)
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Figure 2: The fan for the UK
Under single peakedness, optimality requires that the large bold representative
points of all the exempted goods be above the reduced rate half line, the point
associated with ‘Domestic Fuels’ (the only good supporting the reduced rate) be
between the standard rate line and the horizontal, and all the goods bearing the
standard rate be below the reduced rate half line.
Excluding the goods subject to excise taxes, 87% of total consumption ex-
penditures are concerned. Of these, 67% appear to be taxed consistently with
the optimality criterion.12 The main departures from optimality are the follow-
ing. A number of exempted goods should be taxed at the standard rate: ‘Dairy
products’, ‘Fruits and Vegetables’, and ‘Other non VAT foods’. ‘Food out’ and
‘Public transport’, currently taxed at the standard rate, should be exempted.13
At least in the U.K., if not in France, restaurants appear to be too heavily taxed.
If the government wants to raise more money by creating a larger tax rate,
‘Adult Clothing’ and ‘Leisure Goods’ seem to be good candidates to enter its
basis.
12It is difficult to provide a statistical assessment of this result, given the possible mea-
surement errors on elasticities. If one chooses, as a simple benchmark, the case in which the
representative point of each class of goods were drawn independently uniformly in the half
plan, given the half lines associated with each tax rate, then only 43% of the 87% consumption
expenditures taken into account would be taxed according to the theory. This can be seen as
a weak validation of the theory.
13Both ‘Food out’ and ‘Public transport’ are complementary with labor supply.
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Four specific categories appear to be taxed more heavily than the redistrib-
utive social objective would recommend: ‘Domestic Fuels’, ‘Beer’, ‘Petrol and
Diesel’ and ‘Tobacco’. This may be justified on public health or environmental
protection grounds14. The differences are large: for instance beer would be ei-
ther exempted or taxed at a lower rate, and ‘Domestic fuels’ would be strongly
subsidized.15
Going to a Rawlsian government allows us to look at the impact of the redis-
tributive stance of the government. This tends to spread out the figure. A quar-
ter of consumption (‘Petrol and Diesel’, ‘Food out’, ‘Adult Clothing’ and ‘Leisure
Goods’) are taxed more heavily, a third (‘Household Goods and Services’, ‘Leisure
Services’ and ‘Tobacco’) are unaffected, and the remainder, approximately 45%
of consumption, gets a reduced rate or, more often a subsidy.
This rather surprising outcome indicates that differences in the consumption
structure of the various deciles are large enough to make the optimal indirect
tax rates vary substantially with the redistributive objective. In particular, the
fact that consumers of the first decile devote a low fraction of their income to
‘Food out’, relative to the fourth and fifth deciles, implies that a Rawlsian social
planner would heavily tax both restaurants and fast foods.
All things considered, these results look plausible and may be worth indepen-
dent confirmation and further refinement.
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Proof of Theorem 1
There is no vector space structure on the variables G, and therefore no way
to differentiate with respect to G. To put a differentiability structure on the set
of variables we abstract from the economic context and do as if it were possible
to tax parts of good g at the various available rates. Let πk(g) be the fraction
of good g subject to rate tk, where pi= [πk(g), k = 1, . . . , K], is a vector of
positive measurable functions, defined on G, of square integrable with respect to
the measure µ(g)dg. The program (3) then becomes

max
t,pi
K∑
k=1
∫
πk(g)Vg(tk)µ(g)dg
K∑
k=1
∫
πk(g)tkXg(tk) µ(g)dg = R
πk(.) ≥ 0, for all k = 1, . . . , K, and
K∑
k=1
πk(.) = 1.
(3′)
where the variables maximized upon are (t, pi) in IRK ×LK2 (G) instead of (t,G).
The only solutions of economic relevance are such that the functions π take only
two values, either 0 or 1. An adaptation of the Lagrangian approach can be used
to derive necessary conditions satisfied by a solution to the program (Theorem 7.3
of Jahn (2004)). Both the function to be maximized and the government revenue
are Fre´chet differentiable with respect to the variables (t, pi). Let λ, ρ = (ρk), and
σ, respectively in IR, LK2 (G) and L2(G), be the multipliers associated with the
government budget constraint, the positivity constraints and the normalization
constraints. ρ is nonnegative and the solution is a local extremum of
K∑
k=1
∫
[πk(g)Vg(tk) + λπk(g)tkXg(tk) + πk(g)ρk(g)− πk(g)σ(g)]µ(g)dg,
with ∫
πk(g)ρk(g)µ(g)dg = 0 for all k,
and ∫
[1−
K∑
k=1
πk(g)]σ(g)µ(g)dg = 0.
Taking the Fre´chet derivative with respect to πk yields, for µ almost all g,
Vg(tk) + λtkXg(tk) + ρk(g)− σ(g) = 0,
with ρk(g) ≥ 0, πk(g) ≥ 0, and ρk(g)πk(g) = 0. It follows that a necessary
condition for optimality is
σ(g) = max
k=1,...,K
[Vg(tk) + λtkXg(tk)],
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and that πℓ(g) is equal to zero whenever
σ(g) > [Vg(tℓ) + λtℓXg(tℓ)].
There are typically several optima, and there is always an economically meaning-
ful solution in the set of optima, i.e. one solution such that πk(g) is everywhere
either equal to 0 or to 1. This relies on the assumption that the space of com-
modities has no atoms, and directly follows from the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Let Γ be a subset of goods such that, for k = 1, . . . , n, there are real
µ integrable functions αk and βk defined on Γ, verifying σ(g) = αk(g) + βk(g).
Consider measurable functions from Γ into [0, 1] such that πk(g), πk(g) ≥ 0,∑
k πk(g) = 1.
Assume that the measure µ has no atoms on Γ. Then there exists a partition
(Γk)k=1,...,n of Γ such that:
A =
∫
Γ
∑
k
πk(g)αk(g)µ(g)dg =
∑
k
∫
Γk
αk(g)µ(g)dg,
and
B =
∫
Γ
∑
k
πk(g)βk(g)µ(g)dg =
∑
k
∫
Γk
βk(g)µ(g)dg.
Proof: For every g, let α¯(g) = maxk αk(g) and α(g) = mink αk(g). Note also
k¯(g) the smallest k such that α¯(g) = αk(g), and similarly k(g) for the minimum.
Of course:
A¯ =
∫
Γ
α¯(g)µ(g)dg ≥ A ≥ A =
∫
Γ
α(g)µ(g)dg.
The non negative integral
∫
γ
(α¯(g) − α(g))µ(g)dg, where γ is a measurable sub-
set of Γ, defines a nonnegative atomless measure on Γ. By Lyapunov (see e.g.
Hildenbrand (1974), p.45), its range is the convex interval [0, A¯ − A]. There is
therefore a set γ such that
A− A =
∫
γ
(α¯(g)− α(g))µ(g)dg.
For all k, define
Gk = {g ∈ G|(g ∈ γ and k = k¯(g)) or (g 6∈ γ and k = k(g))}.
By construction the Gk’s form a partition of G, and∑
k
∫
Gk
αk(g)µ(g)dg =
∫
γ
α¯(g)µ(g)dg +
∫
G\γ
α(g)µ(g)dg = A.
The second equality of the lemma is an immediate consequence of the equality
α(g) = σ(g)− β(g).
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The result follows from applying the lemma successively to all the subsets
of tax rates χ = (k1, ..., kn) for which there exists a non-negligible set of goods
such that Lk is constant on χ, and strictly smaller than Lk1 for k not in χ. The
construction yields the same value of welfare and the same government receipts.
This completes the proof of the Theorem. Program (3) has more restrictive
constraints than Program (3’) and we have exhibited an admissible allocation for
(3) that maximizes (3’). It satisfies the necessary conditions for optimality:
Lg(tk) = max
h=1,...,K
Lg(th).
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Appendix on ‘The optimal grouping of commodities for indirect
taxation’
A The case of constant elasticities
It is possible to derive a more precise characterization when all the consumers’
demands have the same constant price elasticities for each good. The utility
functions which yield demand functions whose price elasticities are constant are
of the form
u(x, g, c) =


[Ag(c)]
1/εg(c)
x1−1/εg(c)
1− 1/εg(c)
for εg(c) > 0, εg(c) 6= 1
Ag(c) ln
x
Ag(c)
for εg(c) = 1.
The associated indirect utility functions are
vg(t, c) =


Ag(c)
εg(c)− 1
(1 + t)1−εg(c) for εg(c) > 0, εg(c) 6= 1
−Ag(c)− Ag(c) ln(1 + t) for εg(c) = 1.
The function vg(t, c)+λtξg(t, c) is not always well behaved. The second deriv-
ative of this function with respect to the tax rate is equal to
−
ε
(1 + t)ε+2
[(λ− A− λε)t+ 2λ− A].
This expression is negative for t close to −1. The term in square brackets is
increasing in t when λ−A−λε is positive, so that the function is concave in this
situation. Otherwise for λ−A−λε < 0, which always holds for elasticities larger
than 1, there exists a tˆ such that the function is concave on the interval (−1, tˆ]
and convex on [tˆ,+∞). In all circumstances, it is unimodal or single peaked.
The aggregate Lagrangian is
Lg(t) =
∫
C
(α(c)vg(t, c) + λtξg(t, c)) dν(c).
Single peakedness typically is not preserved by summation. An example is de-
picted on Figure 3, where there are two consumers with different price elasticities,
and the aggregate demand is: A1(1+t)
−ε1+A2(1+t)
−ε2 , with λ = 1.25, ε1 = 0.25,
A1 = 1.8, ε2 = 4 and A2 = 1. Then, the tax rate t
R
g which maximizes Lg is be-
tween t2 and t3, but the optimal rate is t1.
A sufficient assumption for the aggregate Lagrangian to be also single peaked,
an assumption which is maintained in the rest of this Section, is that the price
1
-1.000
-1.004
-1.008
-1.012
-1.016
tax rate0-1 1 2 3 4 5 6
Lagrangian
t1 t2 t3tgR
Figure 3: A Lagrangian function with two peaks
elasticities are identical across consumers, i.e., εg(c) = εg. Then, the contribution
of commodity g to social welfare is
Lg(t) =


Ag
(1 + t)−εg
εg − 1
[ag(1 + t) + λt (εg − 1)] for εg > 0, εg 6= 1
Ag
[
ag [− ln (1 + t)− 1] +
λt
1 + t
]
for εg = 1
(12)
where Ag =
∫
C
Ag(c)dν(c). For this specification, one can obtain a precise de-
scription of the optimal classification of goods in the different tax groups.
Under the assumptions of Section 6, one can derive the following results:
Lemma 3 For any commodity g, with price elasticity ε > 0 and distributional
characteristic a, the inequality Lg(t
′) > Lg(t) is equivalent to
a
λ
< φ (ε, t, t′)
where
φ (ε, t, t′) = (1− ε)
[
1 +
1√
(1 + t′) (1 + t)
sinh
(
r ε
2
)
sinh
(
r 1−ε
2
)
]
, and r = ln
(
1 + t′
1 + t
)
.
Proof: Using t′(1 + t′)−ε = (1 + t′)1−ε − (1 + t′)−ε, the inequality Lg(t
′) > Lg(t)
rewrites[
(1 + t′)
1−ε
− (1 + t)1−ε
]( a
ε− 1
+ λ
)
1
λ
> (1 + t′)
−ε
− (1 + t)−ε .
2
Note that, for any real number σ,
(1 + t′)
σ
− (1 + t)σ = 2 (1 + t)σ/2 (1 + t′)
σ/2
sinh
(σr
2
)
where r is as defined in the Lemma. Thus, we get that Lg(t
′) > Lg(t) is equivalent
to
[(1 + t′) (1 + t)]
1
2 sinh
(
r
1− ε
2
)(
a
ε− 1
+ λ
)
1
λ
+ sinh
(
r
ε
2
)
> 0.
Since sinh
(
r 1−ε
2
)
has the same sign as 1− ε, the last inequality rewrites
a
λ
< φ (ε, t, t′)
where
φ (ε, t, t′) = (1− ε)
[
1 +
1√
(1 + t′) (1 + t)
sinh
(
r ε
2
)
sinh
(
r 1−ε
2
)
]
.
In the particular case ε = 1, it is sufficient to show that a
λ
< φ (1, t, t′) is
equivalent to Lg(t
′) > Lg(t) for ε = 1. Since sinhx is equivalent to x in the
neighborhood of x = 0, we have
φ (1, t, t′) =
1√
(1 + t′) (1 + t)
sinh
(
r
2
)
r
2
=
(1 + t)−1 − (1 + t′)−1
ln (1 + t′)− ln (1 + t)
and Lg(t
′) > Lg(t) is equivalent to
λt′
(1 + t′)
− a ln(1 + t′) >
λt
(1 + t)
− a ln(1 + t)
⇔ λ−
λ
(1 + t′)
− a ln(1 + t′) > λ−
λ
(1 + t)
− a ln(1 + t)
⇔ λ
[
1
(1 + t)
−
1
(1 + t′)
]
> a [ln(1 + t′)− ln(1 + t)]
Lemma 4 For t′ > t, the function φ(ε, t, t′) is convex in its first argument.
1. Its slope at the origin is
∂φ
∂ε
=
1
t′ − t
[
ln
(
1 + t′
1 + t
)
− (t′ − t)
]
.
2. When ε goes to ∞, φ is equivalent to
(1− ε)
t
1 + t
.
3
Proof: 1) Using the identity
sinh a cosh b+ sinh b cosh a = sinh(a+ b),
a direct computation yields
∂φ
∂ε
= −1−
1√
(1 + t′)(1 + t)[sinh (1− ε)r/2]2
[
sinh
(1− ε)r
2
sinh
εr
2
−
(1− ε)r
2
sinh
r
2
]
.
The desired formula follows when ε = 0, using the equality
√
(1 + t′)(1 + t) sinh r/2 =
(t′ − t)/2.
2) One can rewrite
φ(ε, t, t′) = (1− ε)
[
1−
1
1 + t
1− exp(−εr)
1− exp[(1− ε)r]
]
.
When ε goes to infinity, the result follows.
We finally show the convexity of φ with respect to ε, which is derived from the
fact that its second derivative is positive. Indeed differentiating the expression
obtained in 1) for the first derivative gives:
∂2φ
∂ε2
=
r√
(1 + t′)(1 + t)
sinh r/2
[sinh r(1− ε)/2]2

−1 + (1− ε)r
2
cosh
(1− ε)r
2
sinh
(1− ε)r
2

 .
It is positive since (x/ tanhx) is larger than 1 for all x (the tanh curve is below
the 450 line for positive x, and above for negative x).
B First-order condition of the planner problem
without separability of individual preferences
For a (small) group of goods {g} + dG around g, define τ {g}+dG(t, s) to be the
set of tax rates t′ such that t′γ = tγ for γ not in {g} + dG and t
′
γ = s for γ in
{g} + dG. Adapting Theorem 1, a necessary condition for the optimality of a
partition G associated with tax rates t is that, for all k, for all g and all small
enough dG such that {g}+ dG is in Gk, and for all h
L[τ {g}+dG(t, tk)] ≥ L[τ {g}+dG(t, th)].
We prove formula (8) of the text. The first-order condition for an interior
4
maximum is
0 = −
∫
C
αcρc
∫
{g}+dG
ξℓ[τ {g}+dG(t, s), Lc, Yc, c]µ(ℓ)dℓ dν(c)
+ λ
∫
C
∫
{g}+dG
ξℓ[τ g+dG(t, s), Lc, Yc, c]µ(ℓ)dℓ dν(c)
+ λ
∫
C
[∫
G
tℓ
∂ξℓ[τ {g}+dG(t, s), Lc, Yc, c]
∂s
µ(ℓ)dℓ
]
dν(c).
We want to get the limit of the above expression when dG goes to zero, after
division by the weight µ(dG) =
∫
dG
µ(ℓ)dℓ. The two first terms, as well as the
last one, are easily dealt with. Indeed, define, with some abuse of notation:
ξg[τ g(t, s), Lc, Yc, c] = lim
dG→0
∫
{g}+dG
ξℓ[τ {g}+dG(t, s), Lc, Yc, c]
µ(dG)
µ(ℓ)dℓ.
Then, the two first terms tend to
{−ag[τ g(t, s)] + λ} Xg[τ g(t, s)].
The third term needs some more care. When taking the limit, one must separate
the own price effect from the substitution effect on other goods:
∂ξg[τ g(t, s), Lc, Yc, c]
∂s
= lim
dG→0
∫
{g}+dG
1
µ(dG)
∂ξℓ[τ {g}+dG(t, s), Lc, Yc, c]
∂s
µ(ℓ)dℓ,
∂ξGk\{g}[τ g(t, s), Lc, Yc, c]
∂s
= lim
dG→0
∫
Gk\{{g}+dG}
1
µ(dG)
∂ξℓ[τ {g}+dG(t, s), Lc, Yc, c]
∂s
µ(ℓ)dℓ.
The former limit is the own price elasticity, while the latter is the average sub-
stitution effect on the commodities16 in the set Gk \ {g}, which only exists when
substitution between commodities is not too ‘large’. Finally, summing up on
agents, define
∂Xg[τ g(t, s)]
∂s
=
∫
C
∂ξg[τ g(t, s), Lc, Yc, c]
∂s
dν(c),
and
∂XGk\{g}[τ g(t, s)]
∂s
=
∫
C
∂ξGk\{g}[τ g(t, s), Lc, Yc, c]
∂s
dν(c).
The equations (6) and (8) of the text follow with s standing for the optimal rate
applied to group Gk or commodity g.
16We use the notation Gk \ {{g} + dG} as a short hand for Gk \ [Gk ∩ {{g} + dG}]. Note
that since, by construction, {g}+ dG is contained in a single member of the partition, say Gh,
all the Gk \ {{g}+ dG}’s coincide with Gk, for all k different from h.
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B&C M&F D T&C F&V OUF F FO B W&S T DF HGS AC CC P&D PT LG B&N LS
Bread & Cereals -0.391 -0.085 -0.154 -0.02 -0.175 0.385 -0.441 0.812 -0.227 -0.551 0.151 0.232 0.203 -0.381 0.093 0.146 -0.005 -0.474 -0.489 0.371
Meat & Fish -0.026 -0.843 0.038 -0.019 -0.107 0.072 -0.082 0.003 -0.029 -0.187 -0.05 -0.088 -0.173 0.084 -0.024 0.171 0.064 -0.066 -0.062 0.325
Dairy -0.07 0.057 -0.247 0.073 -0.175 -0.206 0.012 -0.043 -0.353 0.142 -0.072 0.063 0.148 -0.044 -0.281 0.175 -0.047 -0.395 -0.101 0.367
Tea & Coffee -0.045 -0.139 0.359 -0.32 -0.266 -0.037 -0.089 -0.322 0.312 -0.338 0.086 -0.034 0.487 -0.768 0.191 0.159 -0.149 -0.077 0.017 -0.029
Fruits and Vegetables -0.088 -0.176 -0.192 -0.059 -0.345 -0.173 -0.04 0.275 0.081 -0.005 -0.045 -0.135 -0.159 -0.37 -0.107 0.146 0.088 0.061 -0.1 0.344
Other Untax. Foods 0.291 0.178 -0.34 -0.013 -0.26 -0.381 -0.22 0.4 0.756 0.058 -0.356 -0.403 -0.205 -0.52 -0.367 0.037 0.047 0.306 -0.096 0.086
Standard VAT Food -0.299 -0.184 0.017 -0.027 -0.054 -0.198 -1.68 0.486 0.354 -0.338 -0.221 -0.554 0.274 1.615 -0.016 0.052 -0.036 -1.11 0.118 0.8
Food out 0.356 0.004 -0.041 -0.063 0.24 0.232 0.314 -0.19 -0.674 0.044 0.336 -0.143 -0.875 -0.517 0.338 -0.181 -0.085 0.307 0.111 -0.514
Beer -0.137 -0.058 -0.468 0.084 0.098 0.606 0.317 -0.932 -1.408 -0.077 0.388 0.883 0.244 0.285 0.489 -0.406 0.111 -0.3 -0.292 -0.427
Wine & Spirits -0.637 -0.711 0.358 -0.174 -0.011 0.089 -0.576 0.116 -0.146 -3.024 0.603 0.063 2.455 1.975 0.877 0.3 -0.31 -0.599 -0.341 -1.307
Tobacco 0.084 -0.092 -0.088 0.021 -0.05 -0.262 -0.181 0.427 0.356 0.29 -0.864 0.19 -0.763 -0.089 -0.144 -0.204 0.1 0.203 -0.065 0.132
Domestic Fuels 0.054 -0.067 0.032 -0.003 -0.063 -0.124 -0.19 -0.076 0.339 0.013 0.08 -0.324 -0.269 -0.817 -0.07 -0.042 0.098 -0.085 0.179 0.335
Household G & S 0.026 -0.073 0.042 0.028 -0.041 -0.035 0.052 -0.257 0.052 0.274 -0.177 -0.149 -0.892 -0.074 -0.037 -0.199 0.007 0.044 0.127 0.281
Adult Clothing -0.122 0.089 -0.031 -0.11 -0.237 -0.221 0.764 -0.378 0.151 0.548 -0.051 -1.127 -0.184 -1.07 0.01 0.111 0.083 1.213 0.141 -0.579
Children’s Clothing 0.236 -0.204 -1.558 0.215 -0.539 -1.23 -0.06 1.953 2.045 1.923 -0.656 -0.76 -0.719 0.077 -0.092 0.148 0.538 -0.047 -0.678 -1.592
Petrol and Diesel 0.073 0.282 0.191 0.036 0.146 0.025 0.039 -0.207 -0.336 0.13 -0.184 -0.09 -0.771 0.174 0.029 -0.383 -0.083 0.124 -0.095 -0.1
Public Transport -0.006 0.259 -0.125 -0.081 0.215 0.076 -0.065 -0.237 0.223 -0.329 0.219 0.514 0.07 0.318 0.26 -0.202 -0.736 -0.254 -0.691 -0.428
Leisure Goods -0.241 -0.11 -0.441 -0.017 0.062 0.206 -0.834 0.357 -0.252 -0.264 0.186 -0.186 0.174 1.926 -0.009 0.126 -0.106 -1.341 -0.148 -0.089
Books & Newspapers -0.462 -0.193 -0.21 0.007 -0.188 -0.12 0.165 0.239 -0.455 -0.279 -0.11 0.728 0.933 0.414 -0.253 -0.179 -0.534 -0.274 -0.127 -0.103
Leisure Services 0.087 0.251 0.188 -0.003 0.161 0.027 0.277 -0.276 -0.166 -0.266 0.056 0.339 0.512 -0.424 -0.148 -0.047 -0.082 -0.041 -0.025 -1.421
I. Elasticities of the demand for goods (rows) with respect to prices (columns)
Decile 1 Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Decile 10 Overall Av. Tax rate
Bread & Cereals 0.03877 0.03093 0.0274 0.02515 0.02306 0.02102 0.01902 0.01702 0.01461 0.01037 0.02273 0%
Meat & Fish 0.11791 0.10042 0.09222 0.08495 0.0778 0.07142 0.06378 0.05618 0.04764 0.03509 0.07474 0%
Dairy 0.08713 0.06931 0.06137 0.05619 0.05036 0.04583 0.04071 0.03565 0.03007 0.02107 0.04977 0%
Tea & Coffee 0.01854 0.01459 0.01245 0.01129 0.0101 0.00911 0.00805 0.00708 0.00587 0.0041 0.01012 0%
Fruits and Vegetables 0.06246 0.05681 0.05306 0.04979 0.04704 0.04451 0.04137 0.0382 0.03413 0.02606 0.04534 0%
Other Untax. Foods 0.04277 0.03724 0.03393 0.03238 0.03079 0.02921 0.02742 0.02586 0.02335 0.01817 0.03011 0%
Standard VAT Food 0.04098 0.03877 0.03733 0.03551 0.03464 0.03366 0.03226 0.0308 0.02864 0.02279 0.03354 17.50%
Food out 0.02647 0.03441 0.03994 0.04437 0.05048 0.05489 0.06071 0.06613 0.07147 0.06985 0.05187 17.50%
Beer 0.02131 0.03223 0.03664 0.03962 0.04116 0.0421 0.04287 0.04237 0.04194 0.03509 0.03753 28%
Wine & Spirits 0.0108 0.01427 0.01685 0.01828 0.01994 0.02109 0.02252 0.02337 0.02487 0.02487 0.01969 55.80%
Tobacco 0.04183 0.05082 0.05255 0.05075 0.04797 0.04394 0.03996 0.03516 0.02802 0.01803 0.0409 79.10%
Domestic Fuels 0.16981 0.14192 0.12375 0.11068 0.0996 0.08992 0.07856 0.0681 0.05654 0.03936 0.09782 5%
Household G & S 0.13618 0.15314 0.16222 0.17019 0.17491 0.1814 0.18828 0.1958 0.19979 0.20161 0.17635 17.50%
Adult Clothing 0.03831 0.05315 0.06014 0.06612 0.07077 0.07433 0.07939 0.08317 0.08745 0.09643 0.07093 17.50%
Children’s Clothing 0.00202 0.00533 0.00752 0.00898 0.01 0.01058 0.01102 0.01164 0.01177 0.01097 0.00898 0%
Petrol and Diesel 0.01385 0.02871 0.03672 0.04445 0.04988 0.05418 0.05819 0.05899 0.05909 0.04989 0.04539 73.25%
Public Transport 0.02006 0.02115 0.02119 0.02007 0.01939 0.01912 0.0178 0.01697 0.01542 0.01481 0.0186 17.50%
Leisure Goods 0.01523 0.02362 0.03047 0.03485 0.04046 0.04615 0.05027 0.05718 0.06735 0.08105 0.04466 17.50%
Books & Newspapers 0.03357 0.0297 0.02724 0.02514 0.0245 0.02337 0.02161 0.02042 0.01878 0.01633 0.02407 0%
Leisure Services 0.06199 0.06348 0.06704 0.07124 0.07714 0.08419 0.09621 0.10993 0.13318 0.20406 0.09685 17.50%
II. Budget shares by consumption deciles and aggregate; indirect VAT and excise tax rate (fraction of consumption price)
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